Expert testimony
Dr. HAYASHI Hirofumi

Introduction

I am a professor of Kanto-Gakuin University and majoring modern history. I have written my doctoral dissertation on the Home Ministry and bureaucrats of the Home Ministry before the World War 2. I have since conducted research on the Asia Pacific War, in particular on Japanese invasion and occupation of Southeast Asia and war crimes committed by the Japanese army, including sexual violence such as the 'comfort station' system set up by the Japanese military. So far I have published more than 30 books or papers including 3 books I wrote myself. My research has been focused on the Home Ministry as the centre of executive power in pre-war Japan and the Military.

Q1: Japanese Government, Organisation of the Japanese Military, Chain of Command

In pre-war Japan, the Emperor was the head of state and had the authority to oversee the government. The competence of the cabinet was considerably limited by the fact that the prerogative of supreme command rested with the Emperor. The military had considerable political power, and the Emperor himself played an important role in the actual process of politics and decision making. Since professor Yamada, the expert witness, will probably testify in detail on the role of the Emperor, I will only give a short explanation here.

After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, in November 1937 the Government-Military Liaison Conference was set up and became the organ to decide on important matters of state politics. Matters of particular importance were decided in the Imperial Conference, at which the Emperor himself was present. If we take a look at the composition of these two councils, we find that the Chief of Army General Staff and the Chief of Naval General Staff, who officially had no competence regarding state affairs, were members of both of these councils, whereas on the other hand only part of the Cabinet ministers attended. The Imperial Conference composed of the Emperor, the military and the leading Cabinet ministers was a organ that had no basis in the Constitution, but came to act as the main decision making body of the state.

As for the army, the question of who had the command over the expeditionary troops, the Chief of Army General Staff and the Minister of War were to some degree authorized to act on behalf of the Emperor. The former attended to military matters like military operations, and the latter was in charge of the state affairs like the budget. However, orders for important military operations and appointment of high-ranking personnel were still issued by the Emperor.

I will give below a short explanation of the organization of the army. In peacetime, the uppermost unit in the hierarchy was Division, but during the wartime Army was established as unit above Division, and if necessary Area Army as unit above Army. At the time of the outbreak of the Pacific War, for example, the China Expeditionary Army, the Southern army and the Kwantung army were under the command of the Imperial General Headquarters. The Southern army, in charge of the occupation of Southeast Asia, was divided into four Armies: the 14th, the 15th, the 16th, and the 25th Army, and each of the Army was composed of several Divisions. The China Expeditionary Army was composed of the North China Area Army, the 11th Army, the 13th Army and the 23rd Army, and the North China Area Army subdivided into the 1st Army, the 12th Army and others.
The hierarchical organization of the army therefore presents us with a structure that placed the Emperor at the top, followed by the Imperial General Headquarters → Area Army → Army → Division → (Brigade) → Regiment → Battalion → Company.

It goes without saying that the military was one of the most important factors in warfare, but total war, and we are talking about total war here, is not only a matter of the military. Rather we find nationwide full mobilization that involved the economy, labor, education facilities, local government bodies, and other institutions. If we look at local government bodies, the prefecture governor was appointed from among the ranks of Home Ministry officials, and key positions in prefecture administration were also appointed from Home ministry bureaucrats. The Police Bureau of the Home Ministry had full control over the administration of the police in the prefectures. It is important to keep in mind that the war was not conducted only through military means, but involved full mobilization of administrative organs on the national and local level.

Q2 Spread of the ‘comfort stations’ and characteristics of sexual violence in different regions

The first ‘comfort stations’ were set up in Shanghai, when Japan began its invasion into China following the Manchuria Incident in 1931. From 1937 on, when Japan had entered into full-fledged war with China and continuously expanded its occupied territories, the Japanese army set up ‘comfort stations’ in different parts of China. In 1940 when Japanese troops advanced into Indochina, the first ‘comfort stations’ in Southeast Asia were established. The landing of Japanese troops on the Malay peninsula in December 1941 marks the outbreak of the Asia Pacific War. In the following year, in May 1942, the advancing military operations were completed and the territories occupied by the Japanese had reached their maximum extension. With Burma and the Andaman and Nikobar isles, Indian possessions, in the West, the Indonesian isles facing Australia in the South, and the Solomon and Marshall isles group in the East, large parts of the Pacific isles were brought under Japanese rule. If one compares a map of the geographical distribution of ‘comfort stations’ with the territories occupied by Japan, it becomes immediately clear that the ‘comfort stations’ set up by the Japanese military covered more or less the whole area of occupied territories. Towards the end of the war, when Japan started to prepare herself for a decisive battle in the homeland against counteroffensives of the Allies forces and troops were stationed on the Japanese isles, ‘comfort stations’ were set up in Okinawa and other parts of Japan as well.

We can make out different patterns in the acts of sexual violence committed by the Japanese military in different regions. If we take China as an example, the first type is illustrated by the systematic establishment of ‘comfort stations’ in urban areas. Women from Korea, Taiwan, Japan and other places were sent as ‘comfort women’ to these stations, which were set up by the army’s quartermaster corps. Type 1 was most common in areas where Japanese military rule was at least to some extent established and the rape of local women was kept in check by the military police in order to win the support of the local population.

Type 2 was mostly found in rural areas where strong anti-Japanese resistance was present and the local population as a whole was considered Anti-Japanese by the Japanese army. In these areas the army not only committed massacres, ill-treating, and looting, but the rape of local women by soldiers went unchecked. The appalling acts of sexual violence the Japanese army perpetrated in Shanxi Province can be regarded as representative for this pattern. In these regions Japanese troops forcibly abducted women, confined them and raped them over and over again. In addition, it happened frequently that Japanese troops forced the village leaders to provide them with women. The overwhelming majority of the victims in this latter case were local Chinese women. In practice, we very often encounter a mixture of the two types cited above. The soldiers of the Imperial army, while making use of ‘comfort stations’ in the relatively stable urban areas, committed a series of atrocities ranging from massacres to rape when sent on punitive operations.
to areas where strong resistance against Japanese rule existed. In other words, sexual violence against the women at the 'comfort stations' existed alongside with rape of local women.

The situation in the various Southeast Asian regions was essentially the same as in China, but different regions had their specific characteristics. In the Philippines we encounter mostly the second type, since the local guerrilla put up strong Anti-Japanese resistance and the isles had become the seat of war due to the counteroffensive of the US forces. If we take a look at the stories victims of sexual violence from the Philippines have to tell, we find that reports of women being abducted and raped while being confined outweigh the cases of women forced to work in the systematized ‘comfort stations’. On the Malay peninsula, on the other hand, the situation was comparatively stable and up to the end of the war no counterattacks of the Allied forces took place. The ‘comfort stations’ run by the military administration were kept up until the very end, and even though several cases of type 2 were reported, it seems that sexual violence of type 1 was the one most frequently committed.

Both the Home Ministry and other Ministries dispatched their officials to the military administration, and there can be no doubt that government officials had an important role to play in the military occupation, and that Japanese occupation of Asian territories was not conducted only by the military. I would like to point out here that government officials were actively involved in the administration of the ‘comfort stations’.

The acts of sexual violence perpetrated by the Imperial military covered the whole of the occupied territories, ranging from cases of women who were forced by various means to be ‘comfort women’ at the comfort stations, to those of women who were raped while being confined. The victims of this sexual violence were women from the Japanese colonies, Korea and Taiwan, Japanese women and women from China, Southeast Asia and the Pacific region. The extent and systematic character of the sexual violence committed by the Japanese military makes it impossible to explain these acts as transgression committed by a handful of inhumane criminals. They give proof of the fact that both the Japanese military and organs of the Japanese government, in other words the Japanese state as a whole was actively involved in these atrocities.
3. Concrete Examples to show the state’s involvement in the crime

Now I would like to present you two concrete examples to show the state’s involvement in the crime. The first is 1938 Home Ministry document regarding dispatch of a staff officer of the 21st Army stationed in the Southern part of China to Tokyo in order to recruit “comfort” women. This staff officer accompanied by a section chief of the Ministry of War requested the Police Bureau of the Home Ministry to recruit women. The Police Bureau then notified in the name of the Chief of the Bureau to prefecture governors to select appropriate managers for the recruitment and to offer assistance to them in this matter. The Office of Army General Staff itself was also deeply involved in this operation. Each prefecture accordingly selected appropriate managers to gather women, who would have to be issued necessary identification papers before they were sent to China. These tasks were carried out by the police. So the order came down from the governor to the chief of police bureau and then to chiefs of police stations, which mobilized a number of police officers.

In other words, the recruitment and transfer of those women was systematically organized not only through the expeditionary forces, the Office of Army General Staff in Tokyo but also administrative machinery. All levels of administrative structure, central as well as local, were involved in these operations. Incidentally, the Governor-General of Taiwan was also made a similar request, and no doubt the same kind of local prefectural and police network of authorities were utilized in a systematic way.

The second example is documents of the Taiwan Colonization Company regarding “comfort” stations in Hainan island. These particular “comfort” stations were under the Navy’s control. The establishment of “comfort” stations in Hainan was planned in the joint meeting of the three ministries of the Army, Navy and the Foreign Office. They made a request through the Government-General of Taiwan to the Taiwan Colonization Company for the establishment of “comfort” stations and recruitment of “comfort” women. In April 1939, the Chief of the Research Section, Government-
General of Taiwan asked the director of the Taiwan Colonization Company to dispatch 90 "comfort" women to Hainan island. According to these documents, the Taiwan Colonization Company thought it inappropriate for the company itself to carry out the task, so it ordered its subsidiary Fukudai Company to do the job in its behalf. Accordingly, a contract was concluded between the two companies so that the Taiwan Colonization Company would supply funds to Fukudai Company in order for Fukudai to lend money to the proprietors of "comfort" stations. This contract was signed by the president of Taiwan Colonization Company KATO Kyohei, who had been one of high-rank executives of Mitsubishi Zaibatsu and was appointed the president of the Taiwan Colonization Company at the request of the then Prime Minister HIROTA Koki. The Taiwan Colonization Company was a semi-governmental company established with the help from the Government-General of Taiwan, the War and the Navy Ministry and the Foreign Ministry. This shows that the establishment of "comfort" stations involved not only the military but also the Foreign Ministry, the Governor-General of Taiwan, and semi-governmental companies such as the Taiwan Colonization Company.

There remains a document which includes a name list of businesspersons and "comfort" women sent from Taiwan to Hainan island, most of which seemed to be Japanese women who had lived in Taiwan. When you combine this information with the Home Ministry's document mentioned above, you are able to affirm that a considerable number of Japanese women were sent to China as "comfort" women.

Finally, I will end my testimony by concluding that within the framework of total mobilization in the Asia Pacific War, the establishment and development of "comfort" stations by the Japanese Military was not only carried out by the total involvement of every section of the Military but also by administrative machinery at every level of Japanese state.

Thank you.